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RECENT DECISIONS
INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY INSURING AGAINST Ac-
CIDENTAL INjuRY.-Defendant insured plaintiff's husband against
the results of bodily injuries "caused directly and independently of
all other causes by accidental means." The policy was not to "cover
accident, injury, disability, death or other loss caused wholly or partly
by disease or bodily or mental infirmity or medical or surgical treat-
ment therefor." The insured, while lifting a milk can, slipped and
fell, the can striking him on the abdomen. It was found that a small
ulcer at the junction of the stomach and duodenum had weakened the
wall, with the result that the impact of the blow was followed by
perforation, permitting the contents of the stomach to escape into the
peritoneum, causing peritonitis, and later death. The evidence showed
that the existence of the ulcer was unknown to the insured and were
it not for the blow would have had no effect upon his health, for it
was dormant and not progressive. In an action by the beneficiary
under the policy, Held, judgment for plaintiff. Death was the result
of an accident to the exclusion of all other causes; the ulcer was not
a disease or an infirmity within the meaning of the policy. Silverstein
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 81, 171 N. E. 914 (1930).
The words "bodily infirmity or disease" are frequently used in
policies of insurance and have a well-understood meaning. They are
construed to be practically synonymous and to refer only to an ail-
ment or disease of a settled character.' Since a slight impairment of
full bodily vigor may constitute an inffirmity, it is apparent that in
order to be excluded from the coverage of the policy, the disease or
infirmity must be of a substantial character and so significant that it
would be commonly regarded as an infirmity.2 A different construc-
tion of the term would tend to limit narrowly the scope of the insur-
ance contract and reduce its coverage to an absurdity. In giving
effect to the intentions of the parties, the Court is properly guided
by the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary man
when making contracts of this type.3 It follows that the parties con-
templated the policy would cover a condition which, though abnormal
or "unsound in itself, would not be the producing cause of injury. The
ulcer was a harmless condition; it did not materially impair the bodily
powers of the insured.4 Only as a consequence of the blow did it
become a source of mischief. The blow, therefore, was the moving,
sole and proximate cause of the death, and whether the ulcer con-
1 C. J. 452; Cooley, Briefs on Insurance, vol. 4, p. 3198; Meyer v. Fidel-
ity, etc. Co.. 96 Iowa 378, 65 N. W. 328 (1895), Manufacturers' Accident
Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 945 (C. C. A., 6th), 22 L. R. A. 620 (1893).
'Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 453,
138 N. E. 401 (1923).
3 Bird v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 51. 120 N. E. 86, 87
(1918); Goldstein v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 236 N. Y. 178, 183, 140 N. E.
235, 236 (1923) ; Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303,
146 N. B. 432, 38 A. L. R. 1115 (1925).
'Black v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 121 Fed. 732 (C. C. A., 3rd), 61 L. R. A.
500 (1903).
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tributed directly or indirectly is immaterial. It has been held that if
in the act which precedes the injury something unforeseen, unex-
pected or unusual occurs which produces the.injury, then the injury
may be said to have resulted through accidental means.5 The govern-
ing principle is well stated to be that "if there is no active disease, but
merely a frail general condition, so that powers of resistance are
easily overcome, or merely a tendency to disease which is started up
and made operative, whereby death results, then there may be recov-
ery even though the accident would not have caused that effect upon
a healthy person in a normal state." 6 In determining the liability of
the insurer in actions of this type, the doctrine of following the chain
of causation is properly restricted by the courts to the terms of the
contract as contemplated by the parties.7
R.L.
INSURANcE-FALsITY OF MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS VI-
TIATES POLICY-SECTION 58, INSURANCE LAW CONSTRUED.-Plain-
tiff beneficiary under her husband's life insurance policy upon his
death brought this action for $10,000 on the policy. Defendant denied
liability on the ground that the plaintiff's husband gave false answers
to questions in regard to previous consultation with and treatment by
physicians. Plaintiff contended the answers to such questions were
truthfully made to the defendant's local agent and medical examiner
and that they had full knowledge of the facts although the answers
as contained in the written application were found to be false. The
plaintiff claims that the defendant is not deceived and the represen-
tations, though material, are not fraudulent. Held, for defendant.
Minsker v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 254
N. Y. 333, 172 N. E. - (1930).
Prior to the enactment of section 58 of the Insurance Lawlthe case
'Mutual Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1888) ;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 11 F. (2nd) 486 (C. C. A., 4th), 59 A. L. R.
1240 (1926) ; Western Com. Travelers' Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (C. C. A.,
8th), 40 L. R. A. 653 (1898).
'Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., at 85. quoting Rugg, Ch. J., in
Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558,
at 564, 124 N. E. 517, 520 (1919).
Schwartz v. Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Assn. of America,
254 N. Y. , 172 N. E. , decided June 3. 1930, aff'g 227 App. Div. 711, id.
132 Misc. 200 (1928); Lewis v. Ocean Accident & G. Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 20,
120 N. E. 56, 7 A. L. R. 1129 (1918).
'N. Y. Insurance Law, sec. 58 (Laws of 1906, ch. 326) provides in
part "that every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the state on or
after the first day of January, 1907, by any life insurance corporation doing
business within the state, shall contain the entire contract between the parties,
and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any constitution,
by-laws, rules, application or any other writings, unless the same are indorsed
upon or attached to the policy when issued; and all statements purporting to be
made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations
and not warranties. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall be void."
